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Abstract
Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS) is a top-tier annual conference
in machine learning. The 2016 edition of the conference comprised more than
2,400 paper submissions, 3,000 reviewers, and 8,000 attendees. This represents a
growth of nearly 40% in terms of submissions, 96% in terms of reviewers, and over
100% in terms of attendees as compared to the previous year. The massive scale
as well as rapid growth of the conference calls for a thorough quality assessment
of the peer-review process and novel means of improvement. In this paper, we
analyze several aspects of the data collected during the review process, including an
experiment investigating the efficacy of collecting ordinal rankings from reviewers.
Our goal is to check the soundness of the review process, and provide insights that
may be useful in the design of the review process of subsequent conferences.
1 Introduction
The review process for NIPS 2016 involved 2,425 papers submitted by 5,756 authors, 100 area chairs,
and 3,242 active reviewers submitting 13,674 reviews in total. Designing a review process as fair
as possible at this scale was a challenge. In order to scale, all parts of the process have to be as
decentralized as possible. Just to get a feeling, if the two program chairs were supposed to take final
decisions just for the 5% most challenging submissions, which means that they would have to read
and decide on 150 papers — this is the scale of a whole conference such as COLT. Furthermore,
the complexity of the logistics and software to manage the review process is rather high already.
A controlled experiment (Lawrence and Cortes, 2014) from NIPS 2014 has shown that there is a
high disagreement in the reviews. Hence the primary goal must be to keep bias and variance of the
decisions as small as possible.
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In this paper, we present an analysis of many aspects of the data collected throughout the review phase
of the NIPS 2016 conference, performed subsequent to the completion of the review process. Our
goal in this analysis is to examine various aspects of the data collected from the peer review process
to check for any systematic issues. Before delving into the details, the reader should importantly note
the following limitations of this analysis:
• There is no ground truth ranking of the papers or knowledge of the set of papers which should
ideally have been accepted.
• The analysis is post hoc, unlike the controlled experiment from NIPS 2014 (Lawrence and
Cortes, 2014).
• The analysis primarily evaluates the ratings and rankings provided by reviewers, and does not
study the textual comments provided by the reviewers.
The analysis is used to obtain insights into the peer-review process, usable suggestions for subsequent
conferences, and important open problems towards improving peer-review in academia.
Here is a summary of our findings:
(i) there are very few positive bids by reviewers and area chairs (Section 3.1),
(ii) graph-theoretic techniques can be used to ensure a good reviewer assignment (Section 3.2),
(iii) there is significant miscalibration with respect to the rating scale (Section 3.3),
(iv) review scores provided by invited and volunteer reviewers have comparable biases and variance;
junior reviewers report a lower confidence (Section 3.4),
(v) there is little change in reviewer scores after rebuttals (Section 3.5),
(vi) there is no observable bias towards any research area in accepted papers (Section 3.6),
(vii) there is lower disagreement among reviewers in NIPS 2016 as compared to NIPS 2015 (Sec-
tion 3.7),
(viii) significant fraction of scores provided by the reviewers are tied and ordinal rankings can
ameliorate this issue (Section 3.8),
(ix) there are some inconsistencies in the reviews and these can be identified in an automated manner
using ordinal rankings (Section 3.9).
We describe the review procedure followed at NIPS 2016 in Section 2. We present an elaborate
description of the analysis and the results in Section 3. Alongside each analysis, we present a set of
key observations, action items for future conferences, and some open problems that arise out of the
analysis. We conclude the paper with a discussion in Section 4.
2 Review procedure
In this section, we present an overview of the design of the review process at NIPS 2016.
2.1 Selecting area chairs and reviewers
Area Chairs (ACs) are the backbone of the NIPS reviewing process. Their role is similar to that of
an associate editor for a journal. Each AC typically handles 20-30 submissions, so with an estimated
number of submissions between 2000 and 3000, we needed to recruit about 100 area chairs. As it is
impossible to intimately know all the diverse research areas covered by NIPS, we came up with the
following procedure. We asked the NIPS Board and all the ACs of NIPS from the past two years to
nominate potential ACs for this year. In this manner, we covered the entire variety of NIPS topics and
obtained qualified suggestions. We obtained around 350 suggestions. We asked the NIPS Board to
go through the list of suggested ACs and vote in favor of suggested ACs. We also accounted for the
distribution of subject areas of submitted papers of the previous year’s NIPS conference. Combining
all these inputs, we compiled a final list of ACs: by the end of January we had recruited exactly 100
ACs. In a subsequent step, we formed “buddy pairs” among the ACs. Based on the ACs preferences,
each AC got assigned a buddy AC. We revisit the role of buddy pairs in more detail later.
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The process of recruiting reviewers is time consuming, it essentially went on from January until
the submission deadline at end of May. A significant departure from the review processes of NIPS
from earlier years, this time we had two kinds of reviewers, “invited senior reviewers” (Pool 1) and
“volunteer reviewers” (Pool 2):
• Pool 1, invited senior reviewers: We asked all ACs to suggest at least 30 reviewers who have
completed their PhDs (however, this requirement was not strictly observed by all ACs). We
obtained 2500 suggested experienced reviewers. We invited all of them, and 1100 accepted. We
then asked all confirmed reviewers to “clone themselves” by inviting at least one researcher
with a similar research background and with at least as good a qualification as themselves. This
resulted in an additional 500 experienced reviewers.
• Pool 2, volunteer author-reviewers: The rapid growth in the number of submissions at NIPS
poses the formidable challenge of accordingly scaling the number of reviewers. An obvious
mean to achieve this objective is to ask authors to become reviewers as well. This idea has been
used in the past, for example, to evaluate NSF grant proposals (Mervis, 2014) or to allocate
telescope time (Merrifield and Saari, 2009). In order to implement this idea, without constraining
unwilling authors, we requested authors to volunteer during the submission process by naming
at least one author per paper as volunteer reviewers. We invited all of them and about 2000 of
the volunteers accepted the invitation.
The area chairs were aware of the respective pools to which each of their reviewers belonged. The
number of reviewers that we eventually ended up with are as follows:
Senior researchers /
faculty
Junior researchers /
postdocs
PhD
students
Pool 1: Invited reviewers 1236 566 255
Pool 2: Volunteer reviewers 143 206 827
2.2 Assignment of papers to reviewers and area chairs
The assignment of papers to area chairs was made in the following manner. Prior to the review
process, the ACs (and reviewers) were allowed to see the list of submitted papers and “bid” whether
they were interested or disinterested in handling (or reviewing) any paper. For any paper, an AC (or
reviewer) could either indicate “Not Willing” or “In-a-pinch” – which we count as negative bids,
or indicate “Willing” or “Eager” – which we count as positive bids, or choose to not bid for that
paper. The Toronto paper matching system or TPMS was then employed to compute an affinity score
for every AC (and reviewer) with every submitted paper based on the content of the paper and the
academic profile of the AC or reviewer. In addition, every AC (and reviewer) as well as the submitter
of every paper was asked to select a set of most relevant subject areas, and these subject areas were
also employed to compute a similarity between each AC (and reviewer) and paper.
Based on the similarity scores and bids, an overall similarity score is computed for every {paper,
AC} and every {paper, reviewer} pair: score = b(saffinity + ssubject), where saffinity ∈ [0, 1] is the
affinity score obtained from TPMS, ssubject ∈ [0, 1] is the score obtained by comparing the subject
areas of the paper and the subject areas selected by the AC or reviewer, and b ∈ [0.25, 1] is the
bidding score provided by the AC or reviewer. Based on these overall similarity scores, a preliminary
paper assignment to ACs was then produced in an automated manner using the TPMS assignment
algorithm (Charlin and Zemel, 2013). The ACs were given a provision to decline handling certain
papers for various reasons such as conflicts of interest. These papers were re-assigned manually by
the program chairs.
The AC of each paper was responsible to first assign one senior, highly qualified reviewer manually.
Two more invited reviewers from pool 1 and three volunteer reviewers from pool 2 were then assigned
automatically to each paper using the same procedure as described above. The ACs were asked to
verify whether each of their assigned papers had at least 3 highly competent reviewers; the ACs
could manually change reviewer assignments to ensure that this is the case. During the decision
process, additional emergency reviewers were invited to provide complementary reviews if some of
the reviewers had defected or if no consensus was reached among the selected reviewers.
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2.3 Review criteria and scores
We completely changed the scoring method this year. In previous years, NIPS papers were rated using
a single score between 1 and 10. A single score alone did not allow reviewers to give a differentiated
quantitative appreciation on various aspect of paper quality. Furthermore, the role of the ACs was
implicitly to combine the decisions of the reviewers (late integration) rather than combining the
reviews to make the final decision (early integration). Introducing multiple scores allowed us to better
separate the roles: the reviewers were in charge of evaluating the papers; the ACs were in charge of
making decisions based on all the evaluations. Furthermore the multiple specialized scores allowed
the ACs to guide reviewers to focus discussions on “facts” rather than “opinion” in the discussion
phase. We asked reviewers to provide a separate score for each of the following four features:
• Technical quality,
• Novelty/originality,
• Potential impact or usefulness,
• Clarity and presentation.
The scores were on a scale of 1 to 5, with the following rubric provided to the reviewers:
5 = Award level (1/1000 submissions),
4 = Oral level (top 3% submissions),
3 = Poster level (top 30% submissions),
2 = Sub-standard for NIPS,
1 = Low or very low.
The scoring guidelines also reflect the hierarchy of the papers: the conference selects the top few
papers for awards, the next best accepted papers are presented as oral presentations, and the remaining
accepted papers are presented as posters at the conference. The scores provided by reviewers had
to be complemented by justifications in designated text boxes. We also asked the reviewers to flag
“fatal flaws” in the papers they reviewed. For each paper, we also asked the reviewers to declare their
overall “level of confidence”:
3 = Expert (read the paper in detail, know the area, quite certain of opinion),
2 = Confident (read it all, understood it all reasonably well),
1 = Less confident (might not have understood significant parts).
2.4 Discussions and rebuttals
Once most reviews were in, authors had the opportunity to look at the reviews and write a rebuttal.
One section of the rebuttal was revealed to all the reviewers of the paper, and a second section was
private and visible only to the ACs. Some reviews were still missing at this point, but it would not have
helped to delay the rebuttal deadline as the missing reviews trickled in only slowly. Subsequently,
ACs and reviewers engaged in discussions about the pros and cons of the submitted papers. To
support the ACs, we sent individual reports to all area chairs to flag papers whose reviews were of
too low confidence, too high variance or where reviews were still missing. In many cases, area chairs
recruited additional emergency reviewers to increase the overall quality of the decisions.
2.5 Decision procedure
The decision procedure involved making an acceptance or rejection decision for each paper, and
furthermore, to select a subset of (the best) accepted papers for oral presentation.
We introduced a decentralized decision process based on pairs of ACs (“buddy pairs”). Each AC
got assigned one buddy AC. Each pair of buddy ACs was responsible for all papers in their joint
bag and made the accept/reject decisions jointly, following guidelines given by the program chairs.
Difficult cases were taken to the program chairs, which included cases involving conflicts of interest
and plagiarism. In order to harmonize decisions across buddy pairs, all area chairs had access to
various statistics and histograms over the set of their papers and the set of all submitted papers. To
decide which accepted paper would get an oral presentation, each buddy pair was asked to champion
one or two papers from their joint bag as a candidate for an oral presentation. The final selection
was then made by the program chairs, with the goals of exhibiting the diversity of NIPS papers and
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exposing the community with novel and thought provoking ideas. In the end, 568 papers got accepted
to the conference, and 45 of these papers were selected for oral presentations.
Like previous years, we adopted a “double blind” review policy. That is, the author(s) of each paper
did not get to know the identity of the reviewers and vice versa throughout the review process. ACs
got to know the identity of the reviewers and the author(s) for the papers under their responsibility.
During the discussion phase, reviewers who reviewed the same papers got to know each others’
identity. Lastly, PCs and program managers had access to all information about the submissions, the
ACs, the reviewers, and the authors.
2.6 Experimental ordinal reviews
In the main NIPS 2016 review process, we elicited only cardinal scores from the reviewers – one
score in 1 to 5 for each of four features. Subsequent to the review process, we then requested each
reviewer to also provide a total ranking of the papers that they reviewed. We received rankings from
a total of 2189 reviewers. Note that the collection of ordinal data was performed subsequent to the
normal review submission but before release of the final decisions. The ordinal data was not used as
a part of the decision procedure in the conference.
3 Detailed analysis
In this section, we present details of our analyses of the review data and the associated results. Each
subsection contains one analysis and concludes with a summary that highlights the key observations,
concrete action items for future conferences, and open problems that arise from the analysis.
The results are computed for a snapshot of reviews at the end of the review process when the
acceptance decisions were made. This choice does not affect the results since there was very little
change in the scores provided by reviewers across different time instants. All t-tests conducted
correspond to two-sample t-tests with unequal variances. All mentions of p-values correspond to
two-sided tail probabilities. All mentions of statistical significance correspond to a p-value threshold
of 0.01 (we also provide the exact p-values alongside). Multiple testing is accounted for using the
Bonferroni correction. The effect sizes refer to Cohen’s d. Wherever applicable, the error bars in the
figures represent 95% confidence intervals.
Wherever applicable, we also perform our analyses on a subset of the submitted papers which we
term as the top 2k papers. The top 2k papers comprise all of the 568 accepted papers, and an equal
number (568) of the rejected papers. The 568 rejected papers are chosen as those with maximum
scores averaged across all reviewers and all features.
3.1 Reviewer bids
A large number of conferences in computer science ask area chairs and/or reviewers to bid which
papers they would like or not like to review, in order to obtain a better understanding of the expertise
and the preferences of reviewers. Such an improved understanding is desirable as it leads to a more
informed assignment of reviewers to papers, thereby improving the overall quality of the review
process.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of number of bids on papers submitted by area chairs and reviewers
in NIPS 2016. Panels (a) and (b) of the figure depict the distribution of counts per paper for reviewers
and area chairs respectively; panels (c) and (d) depict the distribution per area chairs and reviewers.
From the data, we observe that there are very few positive bids, but a considerably higher number of
negative bids.
The distribution of number of bids by reviewers is skewed by few reviewers who bid (positive and
negative) on too many papers: 27% of reviewers make 90% of all bids, and 50% of reviewers make
90% of all positive bids. Moreover, there are 148 reviewers with no (positive or negative) bids
and 1201 reviewers with at most 2 positive bids. In comparison, NIPS 2016 assigned at least 3
papers to most reviewers and many conferences do likewise. We thus observe that a large number of
reviewers do not even provide positive bids amounting to the number of papers they would review.
As a consequence of the low number of bids by reviewers, we are left with 278 papers with at most 2
positive bids and 816 papers with at most 5 positive bids. In contrast, NIPS 2016 assigned 6 reviewers
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Figure 1: Histogram of number of positive and negative bids (x-axis; on a logarithmic scale) per
entity (counts on y-axis) for various entities. The “not willing” and “in-a-pinch” bids were considered
negative bids, whereas “willing” and “eager” bids were considered positive bids. The first column in
each histogram represents number of entities with 0 bids. For example, the first column of panel (c)
depicts that 756 reviewers made zero positive bids and 425 reviewers made zero negative bids.
to most papers. There is thus a significant fraction of papers with fewer positive bids than the number
of requisite reviewers. Finally there are 1090 papers with no positive bids by any AC.
Summary 1: Reviewer bids
Key observations:
• There are very few positive bids, with 278 papers receiving at most 2 positive bids and
816 papers receiving at most 5 positive bids.
• From the reviewers’ side, the bids are highly skewed: 50% of reviewers make 90% of
all positive bids, 148 reviewers make no (positive or negative) bids, and 1201 reviewers
make at most 2 positive bids.
Action items:
• When a reviewer logs into the system, the interface can show the unbid papers on top.
• Inform reviewers of the procedure employed to use their bids for assigning papers. Make
reviewers aware of the benefits of bidding, such as receiving more relevant papers to
read and serving the community by improving the review process.
Open problems:
• How to incentivize more (positive) bids so that the organizers understand preferences
better for accurate reviewer assignment?
• Design a principled means of combining bids, paper content-reviewer profile similarity,
and subject similarity.
3.2 Reviewer assignment
Figure 2 depicts the histograms of the number of reviewers assigned per paper, and the number of
papers handled by each reviewer.
In order to ensure that the information about each paper “spreads” across the entire system, it is
important that there is no set of reviewers or papers that has only a small overlap with the remaining
reviewers and papers (Olfati-Saber et al., 2007, Shah et al., 2016a). To analyze whether this was the
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Figure 2: Histogram of number of reviews.
case, we considered two graphs. We built a reviewer graph that has reviewers as vertices, and an edge
between any two reviewers if there exists at least one paper that has been reviewed by both of them.
Analogously we built a paper graph, where vertices represent papers, and we connect two papers by
an edge if there exists a reviewer who has reviewed both papers. Note that the graph structure is in
part dictated by a constraint on the maximum number of papers per reviewer, as well as the specified
number of reviewers per paper.
Our objective is to examine the structure of the graphs and determine if there were any separated
communities of nodes. In order to do so, we employ a method based on spectral clustering. Formally,
denote any graph as G = (V,E) where V is set of nodes, and E is the set of (undirected) edges
between nodes, and |V | is number of nodes in the graph. We can denote graph connectivity by
its associated adjacency matrix A which is a (|V | × |V |) matrix; we have Aij = 1 if there is an
edge between nodes i and j and Aij = 0 otherwise. With this notation, a quantity known as the
“conductance” Φ of any set of nodes S ⊂ V is then defined as:
Φ(S) =
∑
i∈S,j 6∈S
Aij
max{|S|, |V \S|} ,
where V \S is the complement of set S. A lower value of the conductance indicates that the nodes
in the cut are less connected to the remaining graph. Next, with a minor abuse of notation, the
conductance of a graph as function of cluster sizes is defined as:
Φ(k) = min
S∈V,|S|=k
Φ(S),
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , |V | − 1}. The plot of k versus Φ(k) is called a Network Community Profile
or NCP plot (Leskovec et al., 2008). The NCP plot measures the quality of the least connected
community (lowest conductance) in a large network, as a function of the size of the community.
Although computing the function Φ(k) exactly may be computationally hard, an approximate value
can be computed using a simple “second left eigenvector” procedure (Section 2.3 of Benson et al.,
2015). A well connected graph would have a smooth plot of Φ(k) with a minima at around k = |V |/2.
Figure 3 shows the NCP plot for an increasing number of papers (respectively reviewers) in the paper
graph (respectively reviewer graph). For reference we also plot the same curve for graphs associated
with NIPS 2015 conference. Both plots for NIPS 2015 have local minima at around k = 0.96|V |,
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Figure 3: Conductance value as function of varying cluster size. The x-axes in these plots is the
normalized cluster size k/|V |.
7
Reviewers Papers
NIPS 2015 NIPS 2016 NIPS 2015 NIPS 2016
Figure 4: Graphs depicting connectivity of reviewers and that of papers for NIPS 2015 and NIPS
2016. The nodes in black (dark) show set of nodes identified by the local minima in the conductance
plots (Figure 3) for NIPS 2015, and the remaining nodes are plotted in blue (light).
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Figure 5: Histogram of subject areas in the identified cluster (from Figure 4) of reviewers in NIPS
2015 which is not well connected with the set of remaining reviewers.
indicating that there is a densely connected community of reviewers and papers that are not well
connected with the rest of the graph. In contrast, the plot associated with NIPS 2016 decreases
smoothly and reaches its global minimum when half of the nodes are in one cluster and the other half
in another cluster, indicating an absence of such a fragmentation.
In Figure 4, we plot the graph of reviewers and papers using the algorithm of Fruchterman and Rein-
gold (1991). In these figures we identify the set of nodes that are identified using the aforementioned
NCP method; these nodes are colored black (dark) in the figure in contrast to the blue (light) color
of the remaining nodes. We can see from the Figure 4 that these nodes are on the periphery of the
network with lower connectivity compared to the rest of the graph.
We further examine the cluster of reviewers in NIPS 2015 which is not well connected with the rest.
In Figure 5, we plot the decomposition of this set in terms of the primary subject areas indicated
by the reviewers. Our analysis reveals that a bulk of this cluster comprises a single subject area—
reinforcement learning. Conversely, 50 out of 78 reviewers who identified their primary subject area
as reinforcement learning lie in this cluster. All in all, graph connectivity issues of this form can lead
to increased noise or bias in the overall decisions. Our main message for future conferences is to
employ such methods of graph analysis in order to catch issues of this form at a global level (not just
local to individual ACs) before the reviews are assigned.
Summary 2: Reviewer assignment
Key observations:
• A cluster of papers and reviewers primarily in the reinforcement learning area are
not well connected to the remaining papers and reviewers in the NIPS 2015 reviewer
assignments. We did not find any such separated cluster in NIPS 2016.
Action items:
• Use graph-theoretic techniques to check global structure of graph for reviewer assign-
ment.
Open problems:
• Design principled graph-theoretic techniques, tailored specifically to the nuances of
peer-review graphs, to verify soundness of reviewer assignments.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the mean value (across reviewers) of the score per paper for different
features, separated according to the final decisions.
3.3 Review-score distribution and mismatches in calibration
Recall from Section 2.3 that in the review process, for each feature, the reviewers were asked to
provide a score on a scale of 1 to 5. Specifically, they were asked to provide a score of 5 for
submissions they considered as being in the top 0.1%, a score of 4 for submissions that they deemed
to be in the top 3%, and a score of 3 for submissions they deemed to be in the top 30%. In this section,
we compare the actual empirical distribution of reviewer scores with the distribution prescribed in the
guidelines to reviewers.
We begin by computing the distribution of the mean value (across reviewers) of the score per paper for
different features, separated according to the final decisions. We plot these distributions in Figure 6
for each of the four features of clarity, impact, novelty, and quality separately.
At first glance, these histograms and numbers look quite reasonable. However, what was surprising
to us was the percentage of papers that received any particular score – see Table 1. Even though the
reviewers were asked to give a paper a score of 3 (poster level) or higher only if they think the paper
lies in the top 30% of all papers, nearly 60% of the scores were 3 or higher. Similar effects occurred
for scores 4 and 5.
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that there were a large number of high-quality
submissions to NIPS 2016. Such an improvement in quality has obvious upsides such as uplifting
the overall experience of the conference. The downside is that the burden on selecting the accepted
papers among all those good submissions is with the area chairs, who now still had to reduce the 60%
good papers to 23% accepted papers. A second possible explanation is that the reviewers were not
calibrated that well with respect to the paper quality. In either case, we understand that this obviously
led to the frustration of many authors, whose papers received good scores but were rejected.
1
(low or very low)
2
(sub-standard)
3
(poster level:
top 30%)
4
(oral level:
top 3%)
5
(award level:
top 0.1%)
Impact 6.6 % 36.4 % 45.9 % 10.7 % 0.4 %
Quality 6.7 % 38.3 % 45.0 % 9.6 % 0.4 %
Novelty 6.4 % 35.0 % 48.4 % 9.8 % 0.4 %
Clarity 7.1 % 28.1 % 48.9 % 14.7 % 1.2 %
Table 1: Distribution of the reviews according to the provided scores for each of the four features.
The column headings indicate the guidelines that were provided to the reviewers. Observe that the
percentage of reviews providing scores of 3, 4 or 5 is considerably higher than the requested values.
9
In addition to scores for the four features, the reviewer could also indicate whether the paper had a
“fatal flaw”. We observe that 32% of all papers were flagged to have a “fatal flaw” by at least one
reviewer.
Summary 3: Review-score distribution and mismatches in calibration
Key observations:
• The fraction of reviews with high ratings is significantly higher than what was asked
from the reviewers. For instance, nearly 60% of scores are 3 or higher even though
reviewers were asked of scores of 3 or higher only when they thought the paper was in
the top 30% of submissions.
Action items:
• If eliciting ratings, do not use numbered scales (that is, do not use “1”, “2”, . . . ).
Alternatively, one may employ other means of elicitation such as rankings.
• When making reviews visible to authors, show the percentile with respect to the data
instead of absolute scores, e.g., provide feedback of the form “your paper is in the top
40% of all submitted papers in terms of novelty...”
• Include an expert in elicitation, survey methodology or user interface design to help to
design what and how to ask (O’Hagan et al., 2006).
Open problems:
• Since each reviewer reviews only a small subset of the submitted papers, how to calibrate
the reviews?
• What is the best interface for eliciting reviewer responses?
• What is the best way to present the review results to authors in order to provide most
useful feedback and minimizing distress?
3.4 Behavior of different pools of reviewers
In this section, we compare the reviews provided by the volunteer (pool 2) reviewers to those provided
by the invited (pool 1) reviewers. The inclusion of volunteer reviewers has two important benefits:
(a) It increases the transparency of the review process. (b) Volunteer reviewers may be new today but
in 2 years down the line they will gain experience and become useful to accommodate the massive
growth of the conference. Given these benefits of including volunteer reviewers, this analysis looks
for any systematic differences between the review scores provided by the two pools of reviewers.
Mean scores. Junior reviewers are often perceived to be more critical than senior review-
ers (Tomiyama, 2007, Toor, 2009). As Tomiyama (2007) notes, “You submit your manuscript
and then just pray it doesn’t get sent to a junior faculty member – young faculty are merciless!” In
this section, we examine this hypothesis in the NIPS 2016 reviews. In Figure 7, we plot the mean
score provided by each group of reviewers for each individual feature. We apply a t-test on observed
scores and compute the effect size to examine if there is a statistically significant difference in the
underlying means of the scores provided by different categories of reviewers. For Pool 1 vs Pool 2,
this analysis shows only clarity to have a statistically significant difference between the two pools
after accounting for multiple testing. Specifically, the p-values (before accounting for multiple testing)
and effect sizes for the four features are: novelty p=0.2143, d= 0.0264, quality p=0.0061, d= 0.0581,
impact p=0.0961, d= 0.0353, and clarity p=1.91× 10−04, d= 0.0788. Sample sizes for Pool 1 and
Pool 2 reviews are 9244 and 4430 respectively.
A similar analysis between senior researchers (e.g., faculty), junior researchers (e.g., postdocs),
and PhD students reveals no significant difference between these categories. Specifically, the p-
values (before accounting for multiple testing) and effect sizes for senior researcher vs. junior
researchers for the four features are: quality p=0.0071, d= −0.0662, novelty p=0.0037, d= −0.0704,
impact p=0.0199, d= −0.0569, and clarity p=0.3064, d= −0.0253; for junior researcher vs. students:
quality p=0.4662, d= 0.0164, novelty p=0.8247, d= 0.0049, impact p=0.8733,d= −0.0036, and
clarity p=0.3529, d= 0.0209; for senior researcher vs. students: quality p=0.0440, d= −0.0454,
novelty p=0.0499, d= −0.0629, impact p=0.0076, d= −0.0601 and clarity p=0.9968, d= 0.00009.
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The sample sizes for senior, junior and student reviews are: 6335, 3938, and 3354 respectively. This
analysis excludes 47 reviews by reviewers who did not identify themselves as any of the above
categories.
Self-reported confidence. We next study the difference in the self-reported confidence among
different groups of reviewers. The mean value of reported confidence is plotted in Figure 8. In this
case, we see a statistically significant correlation between seniority and self-reported confidence.
Following are p-values (before accounting for multiple testing) and corresponding effect sizes:
senior vs. junior researcher: p=4.1683 × 10−11, d= 0.1604, senior researcher vs. PhD student:
p=3.308× 10−57, d= 0.3577 and junior researcher vs. PhD student: p=8.074× 10−15, d= 0.1758.
We observe a similar difference in confidence score and effect size between pool 1 and pool 2
reviewers: p=3.9679× 10−44, d= 0.2943.
Consistency. We now study the consistency within reviewers of pool 1 (invited), and within reviewers
of pool 2 (volunteer). The consistency captures the amount of variance or disagreements in the reviews
provided by that pool. As noted by Ragone et al. (2013), “the disagreement among reviewers is a
useful metric to check and monitor during the review process. Having a high disagreement means, in
some way, that the judgment of the involved peers is not sufficient to state the value of the contribution
itself. This metric can be useful to improve the quality of the review process...”
Concretely, consider any pair of reviewers within a given pool, any pair of papers that is reviewed by
both the reviewers, and any feature. We say that this pair of reviewers agrees on this pair of papers
(for this feature) if both reviewers rate the same paper higher than the other; we say that this pair
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Figure 7: Mean of scores provided for different features grouped by different reviewer types.
pool 1 pool 21.0
1.5
2.0
m
ea
n
co
nf
id
en
ce
(a) invited and volunteer reviewers
senior junior student1.0
1.5
2.0
m
ea
n
 c
on
fid
en
ce
(b) senior, junior, and student reviewers
Figure 8: Self-reported confidence grouped by different reviewer types.
overall pool 1 pool 20.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
fra
ct
io
n 
of
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
ts
(a) novelty
overall pool 1 pool 20.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(b) quality
overall pool 1 pool 20.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(c) impact
overall pool 1 pool 20.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(d) clarity
Figure 9: Proportions of inter-reviewer disagreements on each feature.
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disagrees if the paper rated higher by one reviewer is rated lower by the other. Ties are discarded. We
count the total number of such agreements and disagreements within each of the two pools.
Figure 9 plots the fraction of disagreements within each of the two pools for the cardinal scores. At
this aggregate level, we do not see enough difference to conclusively rate any one pool’s intra-pool
agreement above the other, and this conclusion is also confirmed by an absence of a statistically
significant difference in the proportion of agreements within pool 1 from the proportion of agreements
within pool 2. Specifically, for the Pearson’s chi-squared test and effect sizes of pool 1 vs. pool
2, the results for the four features (before accounting for multiple testing) are: novelty p=0.9269
d= -0.0426, quality p=0.8648, d= 0.0039, impact p=0.7296, d= -0.0936, and clarity p=0.8029, d=
-0.0709. The total sample sizes for the three categories of overall, pool 1 and pool 2 respectively
across the four features are: novelty 554, 282 and 49; quality 523, 285 and 41; impact 513, 276 and
37; and clarity 572, 286 and 42. Section 3.8 presents similar consistency results for the two pools in
the ordinal rankings. (We also attempted to run this analysis restricted to the top 2k papers, but this
restriction results in a very low sample complexity and hence underpowered tests.)
Participation in discussions. One fact that caught our attention was the amount of participation in
the discussion by the different reviewer groups: senior reviewers take much more active roles in the
discussions than junior researchers. Please see Section 3.5.1 for details, where we provide a more
detailed study of the discussion phase.
Summary 4: Behavior of different pools of reviewers
Key observations:
• We find no evidence of a critical bias of junior reviewers (except for the “clarity” feature).
• Self-reported confidence correlates with seniority.
• Volunteer reviewers yield benefits of scalability and transparency, with no observable
biases and a similar inter-reviewer agreement as the invited pool. These reviewers can
soon be an asset in dealing with the rapid growth of conferences such as NIPS.
Action items:
• Continue to include volunteer reviewers.
Open problems:
• How do we make most effective use of volunteer reviewers in a manner that authors
can trust, reduces randomness in the peer-review process, and trains junior reviewers
effectively?
3.5 Rebuttals and discussions
This section is devoted to the analysis of the rebuttal stage and the participation of reviewers in
discussions. We begin with some summary statistics. The authors of 2188 papers submitted a rebuttal.
There were a total of 12154 reviews that came in before the rebuttals started, and with some more
reviews received after the rebuttal round, the total number of {reviewer, paper} pairs eventually ended
up being 13674. Among the 12154 reviews that were submitted before the rebuttal, the scores of
only 1193 of them changed subsequent to the rebuttal round. These changed review scores were
distributed among 886 papers.
There were 842 papers for which no reviewer participated in the discussions, 339 papers for which
exactly one reviewer participated, and 436, 376, 218, 135 and 49 papers for which 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
reviewers participated respectively. There were a total of 5255 discussion posts, and 4180 of the
13674 {reviewer, paper} pairs participated in the discussions.
3.5.1 Who participates in discussions?
We compare the amount of participation of various groups of reviewers in the discussion phase of the
review process.
Pool 1 (invited) versus pool 2 (volunteer) reviewers. We compare the participation of the reviewers
in two pools in the discussions as follows, and plot the results in Figure 10(a). In order to set a
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baseline, we first compute the total number of {pool 1 reviewer, paper} pairs and the total number
of {pool 2 reviewer, paper} pairs – these counts are computed irrespective of whether the reviewer
participated in the discussions or not. We plot the proportions of these counts as the “count” bar in
the figure. Next we compute the total number of posts that were made by pool 1 reviewers and the
total number of posts that were made by pool 2 reviewers – the resulting proportions are plotted as
the “posts” bar in the figure. Finally, we compute the total number of {pool 1 reviewer, paper} pairs
in which that reviewer put at least one post in the discussion for that paper, and the total number of
{pool 2 reviewer, paper} pairs in which that reviewer put at least one post in the discussion for that
paper. We plot the two proportions in the “papers” bar. The total sample sizes for the categories of
counts, posts and papers are 13674, 5255 and 4180 respectively.
We tested whether the mean number of posts per {reviewer, paper} pair is identical for the two pools
of reviewers. For the null hypothesis that the means are identical for the two pools of reviewers,
the t-test yielded a p-value of p = 1.36× 10−4. We also conducted this analysis for the restriction
of papers to the top 2k, and for this subset, the t-test yielded a p-value of p = 9.458 × 10−4. We
see a statistically significantly higher participation by the pool 1 reviewers as compared to the pool
2 reviewers in the discussions. However, the absolute amount of participation by either group is
moderate at best, and the effect sizes are small with d= 0.0704 and d= 0.0894 for analysis of all
papers and top 2k papers respectively.
Student versus non-student reviewers. We calculated the above three sets of quantities for student
and non-student reviewers. Figure 10(b) depicts the results. We tested whether the mean number of
posts per {reviewer, paper} pair for the student reviewers is identical to the non-student reviewers.
For the null hypothesis that the means are identical, the t-test yielded a p-value of p = 3.016× 10−4.
We also conducted this analysis for the restriction of papers to the top 2k, and for this subset, the
t-test yielded a p-value of p = 8.932× 10−4. We see a statistically significantly higher participation
by the non-student reviewers as compared to the student reviewers in the discussions. However, the
total amount of participation by either group is not too large, and the effect sizes are small with d=
0.0695 and d= 0.0929 respectively.
3.5.2 How do discussions change the scores?
A total of 1193 out of 12154 reviews that were submitted before rebuttals changed subsequently.
These changed reviews were distributed among 886 papers. As a result, the amount of change in
review scores is quite small. Figure 11 depicts the score change – in absolute value – averaged across
all reviewers and all papers. While the allowed range of the scores is 1 to 5, the change in mean score
is less than 0.1.
From the point of view of reviewers, we see a significant correlation between participation in the
discussions and the final decisions. Specifically, for each paper we computed the average of scores
given by all reviewers who participated in the discussions and the average of scores given by all
reviewers who did not participate (when there was at least one reviewer of each type). We discarded
this paper if both types of reviewers provided an identical average score. Now, if the participating
reviewers gave a higher score than the non-participating reviewers and if the paper was accepted, we
counted it as an agreement of the final decision with the participating reviewers. If the participating
reviewers gave a lower score than the non-participating reviewers and if the paper was not accepted,
then also we count it as an agreement of the final decision with the participating reviewers. Otherwise,
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Figure 10: Proportions of contributions from different types of reviewers in discussions (“posts” and
“papers”) and the total number of such reviewers (“count”).
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Figure 11: Mean absolute value of the change in the scores from before the rebuttal round to the end
of the discussion phase.
we counted the paper as having a disagreement between the final decisions and the participating
reviewers. From the data, we observe a statistically significant agreement of the final decisions and
the participating reviewers with p = 1.6× 10−6 with d= 0.13. We continue to observe a statistically
significant correlation when this analysis is performed restricted to pool 1 reviewers (p = 7.7× 10−4)
or to pool 2 reviewers (p = 1.3 × 10−4) alone. Of course, we cannot tell the causality from this
correlation, as to whether the discussions actually influenced the decisions or not.
All in all, we observe that only a small fraction of the reviews change scores following the rebuttals.
Moreover the magnitude of this change in scores is very small. This observation suggests that this
rebuttal process may not be very useful. That said, there are various qualitative aspects that are not
accommodated in this quantitative aggregate statistic. First, it may be possible that more reviews
changed with respect to the text comments but the reviewers just did not bother to change the scores –
we are unable to check this property as there is no snapshot of the text comments before the rebuttal.
Second, there are a reasonable number of discussion posts, however, we do not know what fraction of
these posts where reviewers shifted from their earlier opinion. Third, the final decisions are correlated
positively with the reviewers who participated in discussions. Taking these factors into account, we
think that the present rebuttal system should be put under the microscope regarding its value for the
time and effort of such a large number of people. It may also be worth trying alternative systems
of recourse for authors, such as a formal appeals process, that help to put more focus on the actual
borderline cases.
Summary 5: Rebuttals and discussions
Key observations:
• There is little change in scores post-rebuttal and a moderate amount of discussion.
• Invited and non-student reviewers participate more in the discussions.
• Final decisions correlated with scores given by reviewers who participated in discussions,
even when stratified by individual pools.
Action items:
• Force every reviewer to change or confirm their scores after the end of the discussion
session.
Open problems:
• How to incentivize reviewer participation in rebuttals/discussions?
• How to de-bias reviewers from their initial opinion?
• Compare the amount of discussion and changes in scores with that in open review
processes (particularly, when open reviews are used for conferences of this scale).
• Compare the efficiency of the rebuttal process with a post-decision appeal procedure to
catch only cases that deserve discussion (i.e., possible mistakes).
3.6 Distribution across subject areas
Figure 12 plots the distribution per subject area (primary subject area), for the submitted papers and
for the accepted papers. Of course the proportions are not identical, but the plots do not show any
systematic bias either towards or against any particular areas. The heavy tail in the distributions
below also corroborates the significant diversity of topics in the NIPS community. A chi-square test
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Figure 12: The number of submitted and accepted papers per (primary) subject area. The names of
the subject areas corresponding to each of the numbers on the x-axis are provided in Appendix A.
of homogeneity of the two distributions failed to detect any significant difference between the two
distributions: p=0.6029, χ2(dof = 62,#samples = 2425) = 57.51.
Summary 6: Distribution across subject areas
Key observations:
• No observable bias across subject areas in terms of final acceptances
Action items:
• Test for systematic biases for/against any subject area before announcing final decisions
Open problems:
• How to assimilate different, subjective opinions of reviewers across different subject
areas
3.7 Quantifying the randomness
Quantifying the extent to which the outcome of a peer-review process is different from a random
selection of papers is one of the most pressing questions for the scientific community (Somerville,
2016). In this section we conduct two analyses to quantify the randomness in the review scores in
NIPS 2016.
3.7.1 Messy middle model
The NIPS 2014 experiment (Lawrence and Cortes, 2014) led to the proposal of an interesting “messy
middle” model (Price, 2014). The messy middle model postulates that the best and the worst papers
are clear accepts and clear rejects, respectively, whereas the papers in the middle suffer from random
decisions that are independent of the content of the papers. The messy middle model is obviously
a stylized model, but it nevertheless suggests an interesting investigation into the randomness in
the reviews and decisions of the papers that lie in the middle. In this section, we describe such an
investigation using the NIPS 2016 data.
The messy middle model assumes random judgments for the middle papers. If the messy middle
model were correct then for any pair of papers in the middle, and any pair of common reviewers,
the probability of an agreement on the relative ranking of the two papers must be identical to the
probability of disagreement. With this model in mind, we restrict attention to the papers in the middle,
and then measure how far the agreements of the reviewers are from equiprobable agreements and
disagreements. An analysis of this quantity for various notions of the “middle” papers yields insight
into the messiness in the reviews for papers in the middle.
Procedure: We now describe the procedure employed for the analysis. Here we let n denote the
total number of papers submitted to the conference and β denote the fraction of papers accepted to
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the conference (we have n = 2425 and β = 0.237 in NIPS 2016). The procedure is associated to
two parameters: µ is the minimum number of samples required and α is a threshold of messiness.
We choose µ = 100 and α = 0.01 in our subsequent analysis, noting that importantly, our overall
conclusions are robust to these choices.
1. Rank order all papers with respect to their mean scores. Call this ordering as O.
2. For every t ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ [0, 1] (up to some granularity), do the following.
2.1 Initialize variables nagree[t, b] = ndisagree[t, b] = 0.
2.2 Consider the set of papers obtained by removing the top t fraction of papers and bottom b
fraction of papers from O. Call this (unordered) set of “middle papers” as M .
2.3 If (β − t)n < µ or ((1− β)− b)n < µ then continue to the next values of (t, b) in Step 2.
2.4 Consider any pair of reviewers and any pair of papers in M that is reviewed by both the
reviewers. We say that this pair of reviewers agrees on this pair of papers if both reviewers
provide a higher mean score (taken across the features) to the same paper as compared to
the other paper. We say that this pair disagrees if the paper rated higher by one reviewer
(in terms of the mean score across the features) is rated lower by the other reviewer. Ties
are discarded. We count the total number of such agreements (denoted as nagree[t, b]) and
disagreements (denoted as ndisagree[t, b]) within each of the two pools.
3. Find the largest value of (1 − t − b) such that (nagree[t, b] + ndisagree[t, b]) ≥ µ and
nagree[t,b]
nagree[t,b]+ndisagree[t,b]
< 0.5 +α. This largest value of (1− t− b) is defined as the size of
the messy middle.
Let us spend a moment interpreting some steps of the procedure. Step 2.3 as well as the µ-condition
in Step 3 ensures that there are a sufficient number of samples for any computation on the messy
middle region. Specifically, the conditions (β− t)n < µ and ((1− β)− b)n < µ ensure existence of
a sufficient number of papers above and below the acceptance threshold. Under this constraint, Step 3
then finds the largest window of papers in the middle such that the fraction of reviewer-agreements is
at most (0.5 + α). Thus a smaller size of the window is a desirable property.
We can now use this analysis to compare messy middle window sizes for two or more conferences.
When making such a comparison, we make one adjustment. In the last step (Step 3), we consider
only those values of (t, b) such that nagree[t, b] + ndisagree[t, b] ≥ µ for both datasets. Then compare
the sizes of the messy middle.
Results: We used this procedure to compute the size of the messy middle in NIPS 2016 and also in
NIPS 2015. The granularity we used is 1/20, that is, t, b ∈ {0, 1/20, 2/20, . . . , 1}. NIPS 2015 had a
marginally higher average number of reviews per paper as compared to NIPS 2016. We set µ = 100
and α = 0.01 (note that the conclusions drawn below are robust to these choices). The results of the
analysis are tabulated in Figure 13a.
In the NIPS 2016 data, we observe that the size of the messy middle is 30%. Specifically, if we
remove the bottom 70% of papers (and none of the top papers) then we see that the inter-reviewer
agreements are near-random, but farther from random otherwise. On the other hand, we observe that
the size of the messy middle is 45% in the NIPS 2015 data, which occurs when removing 15% of
the top papers and 40% of the bottom papers. We thus see that in terms of this metric of the size of
the messy middle, the NIPS 2016 review data is an improvement over the previous edition of the
conference.
Such an analysis is useful in comparing the noise in the review data across conferences. It can
particularly be useful to evaluate the effects of any changes made in the peer-review process. The
ease of doing this post hoc analysis, without necessitating any controlled experiment, is a significant
benefit to this approach of analysis. In order to enable comparisons of the size of the messy
middle of NIPS 2016 with other conferences, we provide the values of nagree[t,b]nagree[t,b]+ndisagree[t,b] and
(nagree[t, b] + ndisagree[t, b]) for the NIPS 2016 data for all values of (t, b) in Appendix B.
It is important to note that this post hoc analysis is not strictly comparable to the NIPS 2014 controlled
experiment because we do not have access to a true ranking or a counterfactual. That said, since such
an analysis can easily be performed post hoc using the data from reviews and does not require any
special arrangement in the review process, it would be useful to see how these results compare to the
data from other conferences.
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Figure 13: Amount of randomness in the reviews.
3.7.2 A bootstrapped analysis
In this section we conduct an analysis to measure the randomness in the reviews in the NIPS 2016
data compared to that of random selection. In our analysis, we first conduct 1000 iterations of the
following procedure. For each paper, we consider the set of reviewers who reviewed this paper. We
then choose the same number of reviewers uniformly at random with replacement from the set of
original reviewers for this paper. We then take the mean of the scores across all features and across
all the sampled reviewers for that paper. Next we rank order all papers in terms of these mean scores
and choose the top 23.7% of the papers as “accepted” in this iteration and the others as rejected.
Our analysis focuses on the variance of the acceptance decisions for each paper. At the end of all
iterations, for each paper, we compute the fraction of iterations in which the paper was accepted.
Letting βi ∈ [0, 1] denote this fraction for any paper i, the variance in the acceptance decisions for
this paper equals βi(1 − βi). We plot a histogram of the computed variances (for every paper) in
Figure 13b. For comparison, note that in an ideal world, the variance of the decisions for each paper
would be zero. Observe that a large fraction of rejected papers as well as a large fraction of papers
that were accepted as oral presentations have a near-zero variance. On the other hand, a notable
fraction of papers accepted as posters as well as those rejected have a variance close to its largest
possible value of 14 .
Summary 7: Quantifying the randomness
Key observations:
• A notable subset of papers incurs “messy middle” randomness.
• The messy middle region is smaller in NIPS 2016 as compared to NIPS 2015.
• A bootstrapped analysis shows a significant variance in reviewer scores for a notable
fraction of papers that are accepted as posters. A large fraction of papers accepted for
oral presentations or rejected have near-zero variance.
Action items:
• Measure and compare post hoc goodness (using the analysis of this paper or otherwise)
of various review processes in order to choose a good review process in a data-dependent
manner.
Open problems:
• Principled design of statistical tests for post hoc comparison of goodness of different
review processes.
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3.8 Ordinal data collection
The data collected from the reviewers in the NIPS 2016 review process comprises cardinal ratings (in
addition to the free-form text-based reviews) where reviewers score each paper on four features on a
scale of 1 to 5. A second form of data collection that is popular in many applications, although not
as much in conference reviews, is ordinal or comparative ranked data. The ordinal data collection
procedure that we consider asks each reviewer to provide a total ordering of all papers that the
reviewer reviewed.
There are various tradeoffs between collecting cardinal ratings and ordinal rankings. In the context
of paper reviews, cardinal ratings make reviewers read each individual paper more carefully (and
not make snap judgments), and can elicit more than a just one bit of information. On the other hand,
ordinal rankings allow for nuanced comparative feedback, help avoid ties, and are free of various
biases and calibration issues that otherwise arise in cardinal scores (Harzing et al., 2009, Krosnick
and Alwin, 1988, Russell and Gray, 1994, Rankin and Grube, 1980, Cambre et al., 2018). We refer
the reader to the papers by Barnett (2003), Stewart et al. (2005), Shah et al. (2016a,b) and references
therein for more details on ordinal data collection and processing. In the present paper, we present
three sets of analyses with the ordinal rankings collected from reviewers.
3.8.1 Tie breaks
An ordinal ranking of the papers provided by a reviewer ensures that there are no ties in the reviewer’s
evaluations. On the other hand, asking cardinal scores can result in scores that are tied, thereby
preventing an opportunity for the AC to discern a difference between the two papers from the provided
scores.
In order to evaluate the prevalence of ties under cardinal scores, we performed the following com-
putation. For every {paper, paper, reviewer} triplet such that the reviewer reviewed both papers,
and for any chosen feature (i.e., quality, novelty, impact, and clarity), we computed whether the
reviewer provided the same score to both papers or not. We totaled such ties and non-ties across all
such triplets.
Figure 14 depicts the proportion of ties computed across all submitted papers. The total sample size
is 26106. Observe that a significant fraction – exceeding 30% for each of the four features – of pairs
of reviewer scores are tied. When only the top 2k papers were used in the calculation, the fraction of
ties in each feature is even higher, by approximately 10%− 15% of the respective value in the setting
of all papers. In conclusion, these results reveal a significant proportion of ties in the cardinal scoring
scheme and also confirm that, by design, ties are inevitable in this scoring scheme. The use of ordinal
rankings, on the other hand, does not suffer from such a drawback.
3.8.2 Consistency of ordinal ranking data
While there is substantial literature on benefits of collecting data in an ordinal ranking form, several
past works also recommend verifying if the application setting under consideration is appropriate
for ordinal rankings. For instance, Russell and Gray (1994) state the benefits of ranking for settings
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Figure 14: Proportion of ties in reviewer scores. The bars titled “mean” and “median” represent the
mean and median scores across all four features.
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“where the items are highly discriminable”; Peng et al. (1997) ask respondents to rank 18 values in
order of importance but observe unstable and inconsistent results; Harzing et al. (2009) argue that
ranking generally requires a higher level of attention than rating and that asking respondents to rank
more than a handful of statements puts a very high demand on their cognitive abilities. Accordingly,
this section is devoted to performing sanity checks on the ordinal ranking data obtained subsequent
to the NIPS 2016 review process. We do so by comparing certain measures of consistency of the
ordinal data with the cardinal data obtained in the main review process.
Agreements within ordinal rankings. For every pair of papers that have two reviewers in common,
we compute whether these two reviewers agree on the relative ordinal ranking of the two papers or if
they disagree. In more detail, we say that this pair of reviewers agrees on this pair of papers if both
reviewers rank the same paper higher than the other in their respective ordinal rankings; we say that
this pair disagrees if the paper ranked higher by one reviewer is rated lower by the other. Figure 15a
depicts the proportion of disagreements for the ordinal rankings in the entire set of papers, as well as
broken down by the type of reviewer. First, observe that the ordinal rankings have a similar level of
consistency as that observed in the cardinal scores in Figure 9. Second, we observe no statistically
significant difference between the two pools: p=0.9849 for Pearson’s chi-squared test and effect size
d= 0.0018. The sample sizes are 696, 348 and 56 for all reviewers, pool 1 and pool 2 respectively.
Agreement of ordinal rankings with cardinal ratings. Let us now evaluate how well the overall
ordinal rankings associate with the cardinal scores given for the individual features. For every pair of
papers that have a common reviewer, we compare whether the relative ordering of the cardinal scores
for a given feature agree with the ordinal ranking given by the reviewer for the pair of papers. We
report the proportion of disagreements in Figure 15b. We observe the high amount of agreement of
the ordinal rankings with the cardinal scores – for instance, the median cardinal score agrees in about
90% of cases with the overall ordinal rankings provided by the reviewers.
Agreement of ordinal rankings with final decisions. We finally compute the amount of agreement
between the ordinal rankings provided by the reviewers and the final decisions of acceptance. We
consider all {paper, paper, reviewer} triplets where the reviewer reviewed both papers, and one of
these papers was eventually accepted and the other was rejected. For every such triplet, we evaluate
whether the reviewer had ranked the accepted paper higher than the rejected paper (“agreement”) or
vice versa (“disagreement”). We report the proportion of agreements and disagreements in Figure 15c.
We see that the agreement of the overall rankings with the eventual decisions is quite high – there are
roughly five agreements for every disagreement.
When restricted to the top 2k papers, we observe that the disagreements of ordinal rankings with final
decisions increase to 27-28% in all three categories (overall, pool 1 and pool 2) from 16-17% in the
case of all papers. Note that the experiments on inter-reviewer agreements do not permit an effective
analysis when restricted to top 2k papers as the sample size reduces quadratically (that is, reduces to
a fraction .472 ≈ .2 of the sample size with all papers).
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Figure 15: Fraction of disagreements (a) within ordinal rankings between different pairs of reviewer
types; (b) between ordinal rankings and cardinal ratings (“mean” and “median” refer to the mean
and median of the cardinal scores for the four features); and (c) between ordinal rankings and final
acceptance decisions.
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3.8.3 Detecting anomalies
Ordinal rankings can be used to detect anomalies in reviews. We discuss this aspect in the Section 3.9.
Summary 8: Ordinal data collection
Key observations:
• Ordinal rankings are a viable option for collecting reviewer opinions.
• There are a large number of ties in ratings provided by reviewers: there are more than
30% ties in each feature and even greater fraction of ties in the top 2k papers.
• Ordinal rankings can be used to check inconsistencies in the reviews.
Action items:
• Use a hybrid collection method with cardinal ratings for individual features and an
overall ordinal ranking to avail benefits of both data-collection methods.
Open problems:
• Perform controlled experiments in order to quantify the benefits and possible issues with
ordinal rankings.
• Design algorithms to efficiently combine cardinal ratings for features and ordinal overall
rankings to provide useful guidelines to area chairs for their decisions.
3.9 Checking inconsistencies
In this section, we propose an automated technique to help reduce some human errors and inconsisten-
cies in the review process. In particular, we propose to automatically check for inconsistencies in the
review ratings provided by the reviewers. On finding any such inconsistency, we propose to then have
the area chairs either manually investigate this inconsistency or to manually or automatically contact
the reviewer requesting an explanation. In what follows, we propose two notions of inconsistencies
in regards to the NIPS 2016 review process and quantify their presence in the NIPS 2016 review data.
Anomalies in feature ratings. We investigate whether any reviewer indicated that paper “A” is
strictly better than paper “B” in all four features, but rank paper “A” lower than paper “B” in the
ordinal ranking. We find that there are 55 such pairs of reviews provided by 44 distinct reviewers. If
we restrict attention to the top 2k papers, we find that that there are 10 such pairs of reviews provided
by 10 distinct reviewers.2
Anomalies in fatal flaws. We now investigate if there are cases when a reviewer indicated a fatal
flaw in a paper, but that reviewer ranked it above another paper that did not have a fatal flaw according
to the reviewer. We found 349 such cases across 176 such reviewers. The proportion of such cases is
similar among volunteer and invited reviewers. Among the top 2k papers, there are 55 such pairs
across 33 reviewers.
One may think that the number of such cases is large because ordinal survey was done after the
review process, so people may not have remembered the papers well or may not have done a thorough
job as they knew it would not count towards the reviews. However, the ordinal data actually is quite
consistent with the cardinal data (Section 3.8.2). Hence we do not think such a large discrepancy
with fatal flaws can be explained solely due to such a delay-related noise.
Two possible explanations for such anomalies are as follows. Either the reviewer may not have
done an adequate job of the review, or the set of provided features are grossly inadequate to express
reviewers’ opinions. In either case, we suggest automatically checking for such glaring inconsistencies
(irrespective of whether ordinal or cardinal final ratings are used) during the review process, and
contacting the respective reviewers to understand their reasoning.3 We hope that such a checkpoint
will be useful in improving the overall quality of the review process.
2Note that the total number of pairs of papers reduces more than 4-fold when moving from the set of all
papers to the top 2k set.
3This analysis was performed after completion of the review process, and hence reviewers were not contacted
for these inconsistencies.
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Summary 9: Checking inconsistencies
Key observations:
• 55 instances (across 44 reviewers) of a reviewer rating a paper higher than another for
all features but inverting the relative ranking of the two papers in the overall ordering.
• 349 cases where a reviewer indicated a fatal flaw in a paper but ranked it higher than
another paper without any indicated fatal flaw.
Action items:
• Check for inconsistencies in the reviews and contact respective reviewers.
Open problems:
• What are other inconsistencies that can be checked in an automated manner?
4 Discussion and conclusions
NIPS has historically been the terrain of much experimentation to improve the review process and
this paper is our contribution to advance the state of the art in review process design. In this paper, we
reported a post hoc analysis of the NIPS 2016 review process. Our analysis yielded useful insights
into the peer-review process, suggested action items for future conferences, and resulted in several
open problems towards improving the academic peer-review process, as enumerated throughout this
paper.
Our tools include several means of detecting potential artifacts or biases, and statistical tests to validate
hypotheses made: Comparing the distribution of topics in submitted papers and accepted papers;
creating a graph of proximity of reviewers (according to commonly reviewed papers) and papers
(according to common reviewers) to detect potential disconnected communities; test to compare two
pools of reviewers; quantifying the noise in the review scores. We also observed that the histogram
of scores obtained included a significantly larger fraction of papers than the guidelines suggested.
This observation suggests a more careful design of the elicitation interface and the type of feedback
provided to authors.
Selection biases that arise when recruiting reviewers and ACs in a review process of this scale are
difficult to deal with. Some designs in the selection of reviewers lend themselves more to bias than
others. In NIPS2016, we made some design choices of the review process with the intention of
reducing these biases. For instance, the recruitment of volunteer author-reviewers helped increase the
diversity of the reviewer pool. They were less prone to selection bias compared to selecting reviewers
by invitation only, primarily based on AC recommendations. With respect to reducing bias across
AC decisions, we introduced the “AC buddy system” in which pairs of ACs had to make decisions
jointly about all their papers. This method scales well with the increase in number of papers, but
is sub-optimal to calibrate well decisions since buddy pairs form disjoint decision units (no paper
overlap between buddy pairs). However, decision processes based on a conference between several
or all ACs, as done in earlier editions of the conference, are also not perfect because decisions are
sometimes dominated by self-confident and/or opinionated ACs. Although the evidence we gathered
from our analyses did not reveal any “obvious” bias, it does not mean that there is none. We hope
that some designs of our review process will shed some lights on ways of improving bias-immune or
bias-avoidance procedures for future conferences.
The reviews themselves were of mixed quality, but recruiting more reviewers (between 4 and 6 per
paper) ensured that each paper had a better chance to get a few competent reviews. We gave a strong
role to the ACs who arbitrated between good and bad reviews and made the final decision, which
was not just based on an average score. To recruit more reviewers (and possibly a more diverse
and less biased set of reviewers) we introduced the new idea to invite volunteer author reviewers,
which we think is a good contribution. In particular, next to many PhD students, this brought a
considerable amount of senior reviewers in the system as well. Some of the ACs systematically
disregarded volunteer reviews, judging that they could not be trusted. But, our analysis did not
reveal that reviewers from that pool made decisions significantly different from the pool of reviewers
invited by recommendation. However, more senior reviewers seem to put more effort into providing
detailed reviews, and participating to rebuttals and discussions. Hence we need to find means of
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encouraging and possibly educating more junior reviewers to participate in these aspects. As a
means of self-assessment and encouragement, reviewers could receive statistics about review length,
amount of agreement between reviewers, and participation to rebuttals and discussions, as well as
figures concerning their own participation. Naturally, the participation of junior reviewers in the
review process is a form of education. It would be nice to track from year to year whether individual
reviewers ramp up their review length, level of agreement with other reviewers, and participation in
discussions and rebuttals. Note that we believe that such statistics should not be used as a means of
selecting reviewers because this could bias the selection.
It is an on-going debate to which extent the decision process should be automated and what means
could be used to automate it. We provide some elements to fuel this discussion. We evaluated how
rebuttals and discussions change the scores. Although this concerns only a minority of papers, we
believe that ACs have a key role in arbitrating decisions when there is a controversy and that this
is not easy to monitor merely with scores. Since scores do not seem to be consistently updated by
reviewers after rebuttal/discussions, maybe the review process should include a score confirmation
to make sure that absence of change in score is not due to negligence. Mixing ordinal and cardinal
scores may reduce the problems of reviewer calibration, tie breaking, and identifying anomalies
possibly due to human error.
All in all, it is important to realize that in a review process of this scale, there is not a single person
who really controls what is going on at all levels. Program chairs spend a lot of time on quality
control, but definitely cannot control the decisions on all individual papers or the quality of individual
reviewers. In the end, we have to trust the area chairs and reviewers: the better reviews all of us
provide, the better the outcome of the review process. We as a community must also continue to
strive improving the peer-review process itself, via experiments, analysis, and open discussions. This
topic in itself is a fertile ground for future research with many useful open problems including those
enumerated throughout the paper.
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APPENDIX
In the appendix we present some additional details about the experiments.
A Subject areas
Here are the subject areas associated to the subject area numbers in Figure 12.
1. Deep learning/Neural networks 32 Causality
2. (Application) Computer Vision 33 Bayesian nonparametrics
3. Learning theory 34 Variational inference
4. Convex opt. and big data 35 Similarity and Distance Learning
5. Sparsity and feature selection 36 (Other) Statistics
6. Clustering 37 Spectral methods
7. Reinforcement learning 38 Active Learning
8. Large scale learning 39 Graph-based Learning
9. Graphical models 40 (Other) Bayesian Inference
10. Bandit algorithms 41 (Application) Collab. Filtering / Recommender Systems
11. Matrix factorization 42 Information Theory
12. Online learning 43 (Application) Signal and Speech Processing
13. (Other) Optimization 44 (Application) Social Networks
14. (Other) Neuroscience 45 (Other) Robotics and Control
15. Kernel methods 46 Nonlin. dim. reduction
16. Gaussian process 47 Model selection and structure learning
17. Multitask/Transfer learning 48 Ensemble methods and Boosting
18. Component Analysis (ICA, PCA, . . . ) 49 Stochastic methods
19. Combinatorial optimization 50 (Other) Cognitive Science
20. Time series analysis 51 Structured prediction
21. (Other) Probabilistic Models and Methods 52 Ranking and Preference Learning
22. (Other) Applications 53 Game Theory and Econometrics
23. (Other) Machine Learning Topics 54 (Application) Privacy, Anonymity, Security
24. (Cognitive/Neuro) Theoretical Neuroscience 55 (Cognitive/Neuro) Perception
25. (Other) Unsupervised Learning Methods 56 (Application) Bioinfo. and Systems Bio.
26. MCMC 57 Regularization and Large Margin Methods
27. Semi-supervised 58 (Other) Regression
28. (Other) Classification 59 (Application) Information Retrieval
29. (Application) Natural Language and Text 60 (Application) Web App. and Internet
30. (Application) Object and Pattern Recognition61 (Cognitive/Neuro) Reinforcement Learning
31. (Cognitive/Neuro) Neural Coding 62 (Cognitive/Neuro) Language
B Messy middle details
In Figure 16 we provide the values of the fraction of agreements r := nagree[t,b]nagree[t,b]+ndisagree[t,b] at the top
of the corresponding cell and number of pairs m := (nagree[t, b] + ndisagree[t, b]) for every value of
(t, b) at the bottom of the corresponding cell. Note that the values are computed for all values of (t, b)
ignoring the sample size restriction imposed by Step 2.3 of the procedure outlined in Section 3.7.1.
Each cell in the table is color-coded by the size of the 95% confidence interval (on a log-scale)
computed as (2× 1.96)
√
r(1−r)
m .
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Figure 16: The inter-reviewer agreement ratios in the messy middle. For each value of t and b,
we report two numbers: The agreement ratio r := nagree/(nagree + ndisagree) and the number of
overlapping paper-reviewer pairs m := nagree + ndisagree. Each cell is color-coded by the size of the
95% confidence interval (on a log scale).
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